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ABSTRACT  
 
The Eurasian Economic Union, launched in 2015, is often seen with suspicion for ostensible dom-
ination by the Kremlin over those former Soviet republics that seek various benefits from reestab-
lishing close links with Russia. Yet the very idea of intergovernmental integration implies that Rus-
sian influence can no longer be applied directly but has to be channeled through supranational insti-
tutions. In the context of globalization the Eurasian project can also be seen as an attempt to boost 
economic competitiveness of its members by reorienting the region from inherently unstable resource-
based models into more sustainable ones, based on vibrant domestic industries. In practice, however, 
the EAEU has not yet demonstrated much economically, especially as far as mutual trade and in-
vestment are concerned, and after the recent resignation of the Kazakhstan’s president Nursultan 
Nazarbaev as one of its earliest and most influential enthusiasts, there may also be political chal-
lenges to the very survival of the project. 
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1. Introduction 
When the Soviet Union was disintegrating hardly anyone envisaged that ra-
ther soon the region will witness a reverse process that would eventually culminate 
not just into anything consequential but in an organization modeled at nothing less 
than the European Union (EU). That is what the proponents of the Eurasian Eco-
nomic Union (EAEU) tend to enthuse about it, naturally supported by the evolving 
class of Eurasian bureaucrats. “The legal base of the EAEU […] seeks to incorpo-
rate the best global practices, including those of the European Union. There is no 
other example of such a deep integration”, said Victor Khristenko, the chairman of 
the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) board in mid-2015 (Pivovar 2015). The 
critics, though, typically see in it either another vehicle of Russian hegemony 
(Dragneva & Wolczuk 2013) or Putin’s “response to neoliberal globalization” (Lane 
& Samokhvalov 2015). Propaganda and ideological biases aside, the Eurasian inte-
gration is a reality (see Table 1 for some of its quantitative features), and its mean-
ingful analysis should first seek to uncover its driving forces and assess their current 
dynamics in order to make well-grounded suppositions about its prospects. 
 
Table 1 - EAEU key figures, 2018. 
Indicator Armenia Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyz 
Rep. 
Russia EAEU EU 
Population, 
million 
3.0 9.5 18.3 6.3 144.5 181.6 513.2 
GDP, bn cur-
rent USD  
12.4 59.7 170.5 8.1 1657.6 1908.3 18756.1 
GDP at PPP, 
bn current in-
ternational dol-
lars  
28.3 179.1 476.8 23.1 3817.2 4524.5 21109.3 
GDP per capita 
at PPP, current 
int. dollars 
10325 19960 27831 3878 27147 26452 43715 
Territory, thsd 
sq km 
29.7 207.6 2724.9 200.0 17098.3 20060.5 4384.3 
Source: World Bank 2019. 
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Having mentioned the issue of driving forces, it is impediment to specify 
them, and the notion of political economy appears particularly helpful here. Where-
as in general its modern discourse has been preoccupied with various aspects of 
generating and distributing welfare, i.e. its “powertrain”, analyzing driving forces 
can be constructed in terms of class or its derivatives. However, such views, despite 
their residual magnetism in the postsocialist context, would necessitate engagement 
in political debates that properly belong to national power arenas rather than work-
ings of international public organizations (EU being, perhaps, the only viable excep-
tion). Since the present article seeks to review the Eurasian integration as a political 
economy phenomenon of its own significance rather than a mere sum of national 
political landscapes of its member states, driving forces here would have a some-
what different meaning. On the one hand they can be seen as sectors that stand to 
benefit or lose from regional economic integration. As the latter is typically about 
exchange of merchandise rather than anything else, the following analysis will focus 
on non-service sectors. On the other hand, though, very much like in physics, the 
ultimate driving force for much of human activity is gravity, and in the context of 
political economy it arguably means existing economic and social structures and 
their institutional underpinnings. As such, the Eurasian integration can and should 
be seen through the prism of current and potential complementarity of its constitu-
ent national economic systems. For any project in economic integration, be it a 
preferential trade agreement or a customs union, is essentially an attempt to bring 
together different production capacities to develop welfare synergies that would be 
not only big enough to compensate inevitable economic, political and social 
tradeoffs, but also provide for a more or less fair distribution of concurrent bene-
fits, i.e. in line with realistic expectations of integrating partners (Mattli 1999; 
Laursen 2010).  
Some economists, particularly those favoring classic Riccardian views, put 
it more bluntly, that is, integration works out if there is more trade creation than 
trade diversion (Viner 1950; McKay et al. 2005). As argued in a World Bank analysis 
of early postsocialist trade developments, “trade creation results in improved wel-
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fare … for much the same reasons as increased trade improves a country’s welfare 
… [while] trade diversion is typically (but not necessarily) welfare reducing” as 
members of an integration bloc must pay more for imports by suppliers from less 
efficient partners (Michalopolous & Tarr 1997, p. 5). This argument echoes earlier 
assumptions by Balassa (1974) with regard to European integration that “welfare 
effects of the increased exchange of consumer goods take largely the form of im-
provements in the efficiency of exchange […] while horizontal and vertical speciali-
zation permits the exploitation of economies of scale” (p. 123). One can expect 
then that successful integration projects lead to increasing volumes and shares of 
mutual trade among their members, which should also be true for other key eco-
nomic variables, notably investment, labor and technology exchange. This idea will 
stem through the first, economic, part of the article: it will start with scrutiny of mu-
tual trade data for the EAEU, which will then be brought together in a single driv-
ing-force framework with data on mutual investment, labor and output across three 
broad sectors: agriculture, commodities and manufacturing. In response to a popu-
lar association of the Eurasian integration with Russia, the second part of the article 
will focus on geopolitical considerations, notably the argument that the EAEU may 
be a vehicle of external activism to divert attention from internal issues generated 
largely by neoliberal ways of postsocialist transformation. 
Finally, as important as it may be for the postsocialist discourse, the 
EAEU is only one among a plethora of multi-national organizations around the 
world, and its political economy analysis would undoubtedly benefit from the use of 
a comparative framework. The choice of the European Union here is determined 
not only by some official allegiances (see Pivovar 2015 above, for example), im-
mense common borders and history, but also by increasingly obvious geopolitical 
rivalry in the region, most evident in case of Ukraine. Given the importance and 
unique nature of postsocialist context for the EAEU, as well as its relative “young-
ness”, the choice of EU may not be the optimal one. Nevertheless, it appears worth 
of a serious consideration as the Eurasian project is already based on substantial So-
viet institutional legacy and has succeeded in establishing some new intergovern-
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mental structures that at least formally place it in the special category of a regional 
integration, as most of its other attempts either lack similar ambitions or fail to de-
velop into projects with “substance” (mostly economic). 
 
2. Economic considerations 
2.1. Trends in the EAEU mutual trade 
An obvious starting point for investigation of economic aspects of any 
modern integration project from a political economy perspective relates to a profile 
of mutual merchandise exchange. Hereto integrating partners are expected to have 
quite intense trade links, reflected not just in high shares of mutual merchandise ex-
change, but also in its complimentary and/or diversified nature. Usually, such pat-
terns evolve historically and, geography aside, involve many other commonalities, 
i.e. cultural, ideological, religious, etc. At the onset of European integration, for in-
stance, the level of mutual trade among its founding members (Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) stood at about one third of total 
(for Benelux it was close to a half) and progressing more actively than trade with the 
outside world (UNDESA 1960, p. 161). These countries “traded chiefly with each 
other” and mostly “exchanged manufactured goods”, also exporting them to “agri-
cultural countries of Europe” while importing “primary products from them” 
(UNDESA 1949, p. 174). And the strength of historical European trade patterns 
was best exemplified by Germany: “one of the chief trading partners of the western 
European and Scandinavian countries” before the World War II, it saw its role 
greatly diminished in the immediate postwar period (to just a few percentage points 
in exports of its future European Economic Community partners), yet promptly re-
covered in the decade preceding the conclusion of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 
(UNDESA 1948, p. 176; OECD 1963, p. 35). When the EEC Customs Union was 
launched in 1968, the share of internal exports was as much as 62.5% for France, 
38.3% for Germany, and 55.4% for the Netherlands (OECD 1969a, p. 67; OECD 
1969b, p. 67; OECD 1969c, p. 58).  
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If the Eurasian Union is indeed modeled at its European neighbor, then 
one would expect a substantial degree of mutual trade at least among its three 
founding members: Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. It would be particularly natural 
given their common Soviet background and very high level of mutual merchandise 
exchange shortly after the break-up of USSR, i.e. in the early 1990s. Notably, ac-
cording to Michalopoulos and Tarr (1997), in 1992 the share of intra-regional (i.e. 
among all 15 ex-Soviet republics) exchange for Belarus stood at 79% on the export 
side and 76% on the import one, for Kazakhstan it was 96% and 100%, and for 
Russia 72% and 86% per cent respectively (p. 28).1 On average for these three 
countries and for the period between 1992 and 1995 mutual merchandise exports 
constituted 55.5% of respective total, while imports were 60.8%, well in line with 
corresponding EU figures if not for its early period, than at least for a similar 
chronological period (1993-1995): 63.3% for exports and 62.6% for imports (ECs 
2003, pp. 18, 20, 92). These were also considerably larger than corresponding shares 
for the whole of the ex-USSR: 43% and 50% respectively.2 By the start of the global 
financial crisis and towards the formation of the EAEU, though, mutual trade 
among its members has substantially decreased in relative terms. Measured by the 
cumulative export share (i.e. the ratio of exports of the future EAEU members to 
themselves against their total exports), it fell from a peak of nearly 16% in 1998 to 
just over 9% in 2014, the year preceding the formal launch of the EAEU. However, 
these dynamics accrue mostly to Russia, while for its smaller Eurasian partners the 
respective decreases were much more substantial (see Figure 1), despite a fivefold 
absolute increase of mutual trade between the late 1990s and 2007-08, from around 
10 to 50 bn USD. 
  
1 For Kazakhstan the actual import figure is 110.1%, which may be caused by highly volatile macroe-
conomic conditions in the period that affected the accuracy of trade statistics. 
2 Here one must not fail to note an early deviation of two smallest Eurasian partners, Armenia and 
Kyrgyz Republic, from trade patterns typical of their bigger peers: already in 1992 their intra-regional 
exports stood at 58% and imports at just 46%, while the corresponding figures for the whole period 
were about only 30% on both sides, i.e. twice as low as for their three future Eurasian partners. 
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Figure 1. Mutual exports in the EAEU, 1995-2014. 
 
Source: UNCTAD 2019. 
 
These regressive mutual trade trends are particularly remarkable given the 
fact that just as its European counterpart, the Eurasian block is based on a customs 
union3 which historically implies rather high and progressive mutual trade trends. 
Yet by the (re-)launch of the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, 
their mutual trade measured by exports stood at just 12% of total external mer-
chandise exchange, which compares quite unfavorably with respective figures for 
the EU both in 1968 (when the Customs Union of the European Communities 
“opened for business”) and in the concurrent period, as well as with the aforemen-
tioned early 1990s data (EC 2018; EEC 2019). Not much has changed a decade lat-
er: in 2018 mutual trade in the EAEU stood at just 11%, or nearly six times less 
than a respective figure for the EU in 2017 (see Table 2).  
 
3 There were several attempts to create it in the former USSR, and the current one dates to 2009-
2010, as the corresponding treaty establishing the Union was signed by presidents of Belarus, Ka-
zakhstan and Russia on 19 December 2009 in Astana, while its common customs tariff took in the 
following two years, partially on 1 January 2010 and fully on 1 July 2011 (Vinokurov 2018, p. 6).  
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Table 2 - Mutual exports in the EAEU, 2009-2018. 
Country/bloc 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Armenia 17.7 18.2 16.8 22.3 25.3 21.8 15.6 21.7 24.9 27.1 
Belarus 33.4 41.7 37.0 37.2 47.6 44.5 40.9 48.2 46.4 41.3 
Kazakhstan 9.2 6.1 9.2 8.2 7.8 9.0 11.1 10.7 10.6 9.7 
Kyrgyz Republic 41.6 39.0 41.0 40.1 29.6 31.2 25.4 31.8 30.7 31.2 
Russia 9.1 7.6 7.9 7.3 6.9 6.6 7.1 8.9 8.3 8.6 
EAEU 10.7 9.3 10.0 9.6 9.5 9.2 9.8 11.9 11.2 10.8 
EU 66.9 65.4 64.5 62.8 62.0 63.2 63.2 64.1 64.1 - 
Sources: Eurostat 2019, UNCTAD 2019. 
  
 
Equally if not more problematic looks the composition of mutual mer-
chandise trade in the EAEU: for the large part it is formed by natural resources, 
whereas in the EU both originally and at present it has been dominated by manu-
factured goods. Such a domination is important because it reflects transcending na-
ture of value creation in an integration project, whereby in search of better returns 
on their surplus capital companies from members with more sophisticated econom-
ic structures tend to engage in cooperative arrangements with counterparts from 
economically less sophisticated and/or smaller partner states, particularly neighbor-
ing ones. A clear example of such a cross-border arrangement in the EU is its “new 
industrial core”, according to the IMF experts comprising Austria and Germany on 
the one hand, and Czechia, Hungary, Poland (notably its south-western region of 
Silesia) and Slovakia on the other hand (IMF 2013). Ultimately, cross-border value 
creation process can be seen as a “sticking substance” for sustainable integration 
projects, which otherwise fail to live up to their typically inflated original expecta-
tions. 
There is certainly not enough of such a “substance” in the EAEU, at least 
as suggested by the current profile of its mutual trade. Indeed, in 2018 as much as 
40% of the latter consisted of commodities, including 25.1% of coal, gas, and oil 
(SITC 3)4 (EEC 2019). Manufactured goods (SITC 6, 7, 8) accounted for 43.3% of 
total mutual merchandise trade among five Eurasian partners, including just 18% of 
4 SITC – Standard International Trade Classification, in its current 4th version was accepted by the 
United Nations Statistical Commission at its thirty-seventh session in March 2006 (UNSTAT 2008). 
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machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7). By contrast, in the EU the latter oc-
cupied as much as 37.2% of the total mutual merchandise exchange, while the com-
bined share of manufactured exports in 2017 stood at 64.4% (Eurostat 2019). 
Moreover, among all 28 EU members, the latter stood for less than half of respec-
tive mutual totals only in Belgium (49.4%), Lithuania (47.3%), Cyprus (40.1%) and 
Greece (39.5%), while among 5 EAEU partners they were predominant only in Bel-
arus, at 56.5% in 2018. Yet even this relatively high share compared quite feebly to 
respective figures of the EU “champions” in mutual trade by manufactures (SITC 6, 
7, 8): Czechia (84.6%), Slovakia (84.3%) and Romania (83.3%) in 2017 (Eurostat 
2019). Likewise, if one took Germany and Russia as the largest members of their 
integration blocs, the figures would similarly speak for themselves, especially as far 
as mutual machinery exports (SITC 7) are concerned. Notably, in 2018 manufac-
tured goods accounted for 39.9% of Russia’s intra-EU exports and for 71.1% of 
Germany’s intra-EU ones, while the shares of machinery and transport equipment 
were 16.8% and 45.5% respectively, or nearly three times in favor of Germany 
(EEC 2019; Eurostat 2019).  
By all means this comparatively and inherently unfavorable for the EAEU 
trade structure stems foremost from the specifics of Russia’s merchandise trade, as 
it stood for as much as 84 per cent of the block’s external trade and 65 per cent of 
its internal trade in 2018 (EEC 2019). Since the mid-1990s, they have been charac-
terized by increasing commodity exports overshadowed by dwindling shares of 
manufactures in total exports. As a result, Russia developed a trade profile typical of 
most developing countries and was often depicted as a modern case of the so-called 
“Dutch disease” (Welfens & Kauffmann 2005, pp. 10-11; Economist 2011, p. 76). 
Very similar patterns are true for Kazakhstan and seem to be developing in smaller 
EAEU members (with an exception of Kyrgyz Republic, where most of external 
trade is unclassified), at least if one judges by the shares of merchandise groups usu-
ally associated with commodities (SITC 2: inedible crude materials; SITC 3: mineral 
fuels and related materials; SITC 5: chemicals and related products) (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Domination of commodities in the EAEU exports, 2018. 
 
Source: EEC 2019b. 
  
 
To be sure, in absolute terms Russia’s manufactured exports (SITC 7) have 
dominated the mutual merchandise exchange of the EAEU before and since its cre-
ation, yet their share has been comparable to that of Belarus, a much smaller econ-
omy (see Table 1). In fact, despite its minor proportions vis-à-vis two other found-
ing members of the EAEU and the Customs Union, in intra-EAEU exports Belarus 
comes second by most SITC categories, leaving even Russia far behind in mutual 
food exports (SITC 0). There is also a visible ascending trend in Belarus’ shares of 
mutual trade in the upper SITC categories (5-8) related to manufacturing, reflecting 
the country’s industrial expertise inherited from the Soviet Union and upheld during 
the transformation (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Domination of Russia in the EAEU mutual exports by SITC cate-
gories, 2018. 
 
Source: EEC 2019b. 
 
 
2.2. Trends in the EAEU mutual investment 
The dynamics and sector-specific structure of cross-border investment in 
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Russia was the source of 21 bn USD, or nearly 80% of total mutual FDI in the 
EAEU, and the recipient of just 5 bn USD, or 19% of the respective total (EDB 
2017, p. 42). Yet as far as Russia’s outward investment in the EAEU is concerned, it 
was just a fraction of its total outward FDI stock for the period, and mostly related 
to commodity sector. 
 
Table 3 - Trends in mutual FDI in the EAEU, 2012-2016. 
Country 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Inward stocks Billions of USD 
Armenia 1.94 2.21 3.06 3.06 3.44 
Belarus 7.55 7.92 8.31 8.36 8.60 
Kazakhstan 10.91 9.32 9.12 7.13 8.25 
Kyrgyz Republic 1.10 1.14 1.33 1.51 1.47 
Russia 4.70 3.35 3.24 3.57 5.01 
EAEU total mutual FDI stock 26.20 23.94 25.06 23.63 26.76 
Russia’s EAEU outward FDI stocks  21.06 20.01 21.06 19.26 21.03 
In % of total EAEU mutual FDI stock 80.38 83.58 84.04 81.51 78.59 
In % of total outward FDI stock (below) 6.33 5.19 6.39 6.81 6.29 
Russia’s total outward FDI stock 332.83 385.32 329.82 282.65 334.27 
Kazakhstan’s total outward FDI stock 22.93 23.37 25.56 26.75 23.47 
Total outward FDI stock of Armenia, Bela-
rus and Kyrgyz Republic  
0.81 1.02 0.95 1.20 1.34 
Sources: EDB 2017, UNCTAD 2019. 
 
It should come as no surprise, then, that in the aggregate intra-EAEU FDI 
stock the share of machine-building, a manufacturing sector with arguably the high-
est value-added potential beneficial both for development of the Eurasian partners 
and internal cohesion of their integration project, stood at miniscule 1.1% in 2016 – 
the lowest among all 13 sectors identified by the experts from the Eurasian Devel-
opment Bank. Overall, commodities were responsible for as much as 55% of mutu-
al FDI stock in the block, and nearly two thirds (63%) if taken together with a 
closely related chemical sector (see Figure 4). The remaining third related to ser-
vices, mostly telecommunications, finance and retail (these three sectors accounted 
for one fifth of total intra-EAEU stock). Agriculture accommodated just 3.7%, or 
one billion USD, which was on par with corresponding figures for such sectors as 
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utilities, retail and tourism. In turn, the absolute amount of mutual FDI in machine-
building for the whole period covered by the EDB monitoring was just 300 million 
USD, or one fifth of a German carmaker VW investment in just one plant in Russia 
over 13 months between October 2006 and November 2007 (Busvine 2007). 
 
Figure 4. Structure of mutual FDI in the Eurasian Economic Union, 2016. 
 
Source: EDB 2017. 
 
2.3. The EAEU current and potential driving forces 
From a classical political economy perspective, the economic fundamen-
tals of the Eurasian integration specified above are important mostly because of 
their welfare implications stemming from potential synergies in value creation. They 
are also instrumental for identifying the scope of implicit support for the EAEU by 
those who have direct stakes in its progress, i.e. employed in sectors with the high-
est shares of mutual exchange, both merchandise- and capital-related. For the bloc 
in general, such sectors are related to commodities, especially hydrocarbons (oil and 
gas) and metals. On the individual level, though, it is true only for Russia and Ka-
zakhstan, but not for the smaller members. Because of their scale problems the lat-
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ter are also likely to have a generally higher interest in the Eurasian integration pro-
ject as it promises them easier access to the large, vibrant, but foremost geograph-
ically, culturally and historically close Russian consumer market.  
Bringing together data on trade, investment, employment and output re-
quires a certain extent of discretionary generalization. Notably, given the specifics of 
the Eurasian mutual exchange, both merchandise and capital, it seems justified to 
identify three broad economic sectors that may not strictly coincide with criteria of 
existing classifications, i.e. those by the United Nations. The first such a sector is 
agriculture, and as far as foreign trade is concerned, it mostly falls into SITC 0, 1 
and 4 categories. The next sector covers primary and semi-finished products as 
found in SITC 2, 3 and 5 categories, and may be referred to as “commodities”. Fi-
nally, the third sector is manufacturing, represented by SITC 6, 7 and 8 categories.6 
Using statistical data provided by the Eurasian Economic Commission, which 
claims to adhere to the UN trade statistics standards revised in 2010 (EEC 2018), 
one can draw a table showing relative importance of the identified three sectors for 
the EAEU and its individual members in particular (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4 - Relative importance of agriculture, commodities and manufactur-
ing sectors in the EAEU merchandise exchange, 2015/2018. 
 
Bloc/country Agriculture (SITC 
0, 1, 4) 
Commodities 
(SITC 2, 3, 5) 
Manufacturing 
(SITC 6, 7, 8) 
 2015 2018 2015 2018 2015 2018 
Armenia 72.1 51.9 4.6 4.9 19.5 36.1 
Belarus 35.0 31.3 13.1 11.6 51.0 56.6 
Kazakhstan 8.8 8.3 64.7 55.4 22.3 36.1 
Kyrgyz Republic 25.8 18.1 18.0 30.5 52.6 49.0 
Russia 8.2 7.7 52.7 49.1 36.2 39.8 
EAEU mutual exports 15.3 13.9 43.9 40.3 38.3 43.4 
EAEU external exports 4.2 4.9 74.5 75.3 15.1 14.5 
Source: EEC 2019b. 
 
6 One of the obvious shortcomings of this approach is that SITC 6 includes goods that may have 
closer association with commodities than with manufacturing, e.g. metals. 
418 
 
 
Viachaslau Yarashevich, Political economy of the Eurasian integration 
 
Although marginally, still for the EAEU as a whole mutual trade in manu-
factures in 2018 exceeded that in commodities. It also grew by 13% over the first 
three years of the EAEU existence, and was three times larger than the volume of 
mutual trade by agriculture products. However, on the country level mutual manu-
facturing trade was dominant only in Belarus,7 which also had the lowest share of 
commodities in the EAEU merchandise exchange, and the second largest share of 
agriculture products. Commodities were predominant in the EAEU-bound exports 
of Kazakhstan and Russia, which also had roughly similar shares of agriculture and 
manufacturing products. In the EAEU external exports the latter stood at just 15% 
in 2018, implying that the bloc’s internal trade has been much more progressive 
than its external one.  
 
Table 5 - Relative importance of agriculture, commodities and manufactur-
ing sectors in the EAEU mutual investment exchange, 2016. 
 
Bloc/country Agriculture Commodities Manufacturing 
% of respective total FDI stocks 
Armenia 0.1 38.6 1.7 
Belarus 0.8 73.0 0.9 
Kazakhstan 1.6 75.2 1.6 
Kyrgyz Republic 0.0 26.0 0.9 
Russia 15.8 47.6 0.5 
EAEU 3.7 63.1 1.1 
 % of respective non-service FDI stocks 
Armenia 0.2 95.5 4.2 
Belarus 1.1 97.7 1.2 
Kazakhstan 2.0 95.9 2.0 
Kyrgyz Republic 0.0 96.7 3.3 
Russia 24.7 74.5 0.8 
EAEU 5.4 92.9 1.6 
Source: EDB 2017. 
 
7 A relatively high share of manufacturing in case of Kyrgyz Republic should be viewed with caution 
as on average 45% of this country’s merchandise exports between 2015 and 2018 were unclassified 
(see p. 9). 
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According to the data from the latest available monitoring report on mu-
tual FDI in the Commonwealth of Independent States by the Center of Integration 
Studies of the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB 2017), there are no grounds for a 
similar assessment of mutual FDI stocks in the EAEU. Notably, the share of com-
modities in the latter stood at as high as 93% if services are excluded from total 
stocks, while manufacturing took a mere 1.6%. The absolute domination of com-
modities here is not affected even with the inclusion of services in the estimate of 
the EAEU mutual FDI stocks (see Table 5).  
However, when it comes to employment either on aggregate or national 
levels, the role of commodities in the EAEU is insignificant. According to the rele-
vant data from the statistical database of the International Labor Organization 
(ILO), labor markets of all Eurasian partners are dominated by services (ILO 2019). 
When they are excluded, agriculture comes on top in three out of five members – 
Armenia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz Republic, while in Belarus and Russia it is manu-
facturing that plays a leading role. Commodities are relatively more important for 
non-service employment in Kazakhstan and Russia, but even in these two countries 
their share in registered employment lags far behind that of manufacturing, especial-
ly in Russia. It hovers around a few percentage points in other three members, well 
in line with arguments about low employment potential of this sector and hence its 
political economy impact on regional economic integration. For the EAEU as a 
whole, commodities provided just 1.9 million jobs in the ILO-reported total labor 
force of 87 million in 2017, or just 2% (9% of the non-service total of 20.5 million). 
In the same period manufacturing jobs totaled 11.7 million, or more than six times 
more, taking the highest share in the non-service employment with 57% of the re-
spective total, followed by agriculture with 7 million jobs and one third in this total 
(see Table 6).   
 
 
 
 
420 
 
Viachaslau Yarashevich, Political economy of the Eurasian integration 
 
Table 6 - Relative importance of agriculture, commodities and manufactur-
ing sectors in the EAEU employment, 2017. 
 
Bloc/country Agriculture Commodities Manufacturing 
% of respective total labor forces 
Armenia 33.4 0.9 8.2 
Belarus 10.7 0.6 18.4 
Kazakhstan 15.1 3.4 6.5 
Kyrgyz Republic 26.7 0.4 7.6 
Russia 5.9 2.2 14.2 
EAEU 8.0 2.1 13.4 
 % of respective non-service labor forces 
Armenia 79.3 2.1 18.7 
Belarus 35.1 1.8 63.1 
Kazakhstan 64.6 12.1 23.2 
Kyrgyz Republic 76.7 1.1 22.1 
Russia 28.8 9.4 61.8 
EAEU 34.0 8.9 57.0 
 Thousand jobs 
EAEU (total including 
services - 87293) 6998 1869 11674 
Source: ILO 2019. 
 
 
A political economy profile of the EAEU gets more controversial if key 
output characteristics are included in the analysis. Notably, commodities do not 
seem to play dominant roles suggested by their shares in mutual (as well as external) 
merchandise and investment exchange. Indeed, even for Kazakhstan and Russia 
their importance in terms of GDP seems relatively minor. Nevertheless, when ser-
vices are excluded commodity shares become more crystallized, closely resembling 
the ones observed in mutual merchandise trade profiles both on the EAEU and na-
tional levels (see Table 7).  
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Table 7 - Relative importance of agriculture, commodities and manufactur-
ing sectors in the EAEU output, 2017. 
 
Bloc/country Agriculture Commodities ⃰ Manufacturing 
% of respective GDP 
Armenia 16.3 8.4 11.2 
Belarus 9.0 5.4 25.6 
Kazakhstan 4.7 16.3 11.9 
Kyrgyz Republic 13.8 3.5 16.9 
Russia 4.5 12.6 13.2 
EAEU 4.3 11.5 12.2 
 % of respective non-service GDP 
Armenia 45.4 23.4 31.2 
Belarus 22.5 13.5 64.0 
Kazakhstan 14.3 49.5 36.2 
Kyrgyz Republic 40.4 10.2 49.4 
Russia 14.9 41.6 43.6 
EAEU 15.4 41.1 43.6 
Note: refers to mining and utilities which stand undivided in the source 
Source: UNCTAD 2019. 
 
In an attempt to summarize the political economy profile of the Eurasian 
integration project, one can draft a matrix that would juxtapose the findings on mu-
tual merchandise trade and non-service investment with those on non-service em-
ployment and output using the tripartite sector approach (see Table 8). On the one 
hand, a very close observable correlation between mutual trade and non-service 
output here is an obvious sign of the EAEU relative fundamental strength, rein-
forced by the leading role of manufacturing, particularly in employment (on the ag-
gregate level, and for Belarus and Russia on the country level). On the other hand, a 
similarly strong position of commodities in mutual trade and especially investment 
indicates that EAEU is still struggling to maintain its positive momentum as surplus 
capital raised through commodity exports of its leading partners is not used for es-
tablishing robust regional value chains in agriculture and manufacturing but is in-
stead channeled abroad. 
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Table 8 - Political economy profile of the EAEU: mutual merchandise trade, 
mutual FDI stocks, non-service employment and output in agriculture, 
commodities and manufacturing sectors, 2017. 
 
Bloc/country Agriculture Commodities Manufacturing 
% of respective EAEU total 
Mutual merchandise trade 13.9 40.3 43.4 
Non-service mutual FDI stocks 5.4 92.9 1.6 
Non-service employment 34.0 8.9 57.0 
Non-service output 15.4 41.1 43.6 
Source: UNCTAD 2019. 
 
Indeed, the stock of mutual FDI in the EAEU is more than dwarfed by 
the cumulative external FDI stocks of Kazakhstan and Russia (see Table 4), which, 
in turn, may be just a tip in the iceberg of money moved out of the region through 
various channels. For instance, only in the first three years of the EAEU existence 
net registered private capital outflows from Russia exceeded 100 bn USD, whereas 
the total of such outflows for the whole period of postsocialist transformation can 
well be over a trillion (CBR 2018, p. 34). And while the issue of capital flight may be 
less severe for other Eurasian partners, it may be one of the key reasons for the ap-
parent procrastination with modernization in general and reindustrialization in par-
ticular as arguably the key factors of the EAEU macro-competitiveness.  
 
2.4. Postsocialist context and deindustrialization 
An inquiry into the economic aspects of the Eurasian integration would be 
incomplete without mentioning postsocialist transformation that formally started 
with USSR breakup and has since been equally acute for all partners to the EAEU. 
From a political economy viewpoint, transformation (also frequently referred to as 
“transition”) essentially amounts to replacing socialism based on collective-centered 
communist ideology with capitalism based on individual-centered liberal one (Offe 
1991). Lacking historical precedents, this process has not occurred as smoothly as 
might have been initially envisioned by its Western proponents and has arguably not 
been accomplished even in those postsocialist countries that joined the WTO, EU, 
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OECD and are considered its showcases. As far as Eurasian partners are concerned, 
all of them initially adopted mainstream neoliberal prescriptions of liberalization, 
privatization and restructuring, which brought about immediate and severe public 
costs but not much, at least in the 1990s, public welfare (Ellman 2000). Conse-
quently, some future EAEU members chose to ditch neoliberalism yet in the mid-
1990s (Belarus), while others (Armenia and Kyrgyz Republic) dragged along appar-
ently because it helped them secure foreign funds necessary to keep macroeconomic 
stability in the face of mounting trade deficit and foreign debt. Arguably, for much 
of the 1990s and early 2000s Russia has been one of the most ardent and important 
adepts of neoliberalism in the entire postsocialist world, while Kazakhstan pre-
served its neoliberal allegiance well into the late 2010s (Aslund 2012). In both cases, 
though, continued neoliberal practices might have been determined not so much by 
some sort of elite enlightenment as by hefty natural resources that helped to miti-
gate substantial social costs of the transformation. Postsocialist options of resource-
poor Armenia, Belarus and Kyrgyz Republic were far more restricted due to their 
much smaller resource endowments, Soviet inheritance (especially industrial, as for 
example in the case of Belarus), and geography (all three are land-locked, with Ar-
menia and Kyrgyz Republic also located in mountainous terrains sparred of 
transport infrastructure typical for similar locations, for example, in OECD coun-
tries). 
Among numerous effects related to the early adoption of neoliberalism by 
the future Eurasian partners deindustrialization, perhaps, is the one that has had the 
greatest impact on the unfavorable (from a development perspective) profile of the 
EAEU mutual merchandise and investment exchange uncovered in sections 2.1 and 
2.2. In 2017, the bloc’s aggregate manufacturing value added (MVA) measured in 
constant 2010 international dollars was marginally but still lower than in 1990, 
whereas in the same period the aggregate MVA of the European Union increased 
by a half (UNIDO 2019). In both cases the dynamics have arguably been set by 
those of the largest members: Russia in case of the EAEU, and Germany in case of 
the EU. Russian manufacturing output halved in the first years of postsocialism, 
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and failed to recover fully even two decades later, standing at one tenth less in 2017. 
By contrast, despite its minor decrease in the early 1990s, in the whole specified pe-
riod Germany’s MVA increased by two fifths, which helped to nearly double its lead 
over Russia compared to 1990 (see Table 9). As far as other EAEU members are 
concerned, there is a clear divide between Belarus and Kazakhstan on the one hand, 
and Armenia and Kyrgyz Republic on the other hand. While the former two man-
aged not just to uphold but to significantly increase their manufacturing output, the 
latter saw it falling by as much as a half. In the EU such a dramatic drop was not 
experienced even by Greece, where MVA grew by a quarter between 1990 and 
2008, having contracted by nearly a third since then, on the background of the debt 
crisis and ensuing austerity measures imposed by foreign creditors.  
 
Table 9 - Trends in manufacturing value added in EAEU and EU, 1990-2017. 
Country/bloc 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2017 2017 to 
1990 
 Billions of constant 2010 international dollars % 
Armenia 2.2 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.9 1.2 1.3 58.2 
Belarus 5.0 3.1 5.0 8.7 13.3 13.8 13.8 275.3 
Kazakhstan 10.0 7.2 8.7 13.5 16.8 19.4 19.6 197.3 
Kyrgyz Republic 1.7 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 49.6 
Russia 238.7 121.6 140.0 187.2 195.0 216.8 217.6 91.2 
EAEU 257.5 132.6 154.8 210.9 226.7 252.1 253.1 98.3 
EU 1825.8 1860.9 2152.9 2309.5 2344.7 2565.1 2689.1 147.3 
Germany 574.6 549.1 608.9 643.3 682.0 775.0 812.0 141.3 
Greece 21.2 20.3 22.9 26.6 21.7 18.6 18.4 86.8 
Source: UNIDO 2019. 
  
Admittedly, postsocialist deindustrialization of the Eurasian partners may 
be related not only to neoliberal ways of their transformation, but also to structural 
aspects of the inherited Soviet industrial sector and its general lack of competitive-
ness on open global markets. Nevertheless, Soviet industry was not unique in lack 
of global competitiveness, and perhaps no less competitive than China’s state-
owned industrial enterprises during the 1980s, yet it did face unique challenges of 
adapting not only to mountainous technological changes of the period, driven by 
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automatization and IT, but also to the collapse of existing economic ties, a stream 
of new regulations, and fierce competition resulting from ideologically-motivated 
radical liberalization (neoliberal “shock therapy”). Coupled by similarly radical trans-
formation of property relations (privatization) and exodus of most talented profes-
sionals (either abroad or into emerging private sector), these multiple challenges 
proved detrimental for much of the postsocialist industry, in particular its most 
knowledge-intensive sectors such as electronics and machine-building, consistently 
forming the bulk of OECD exports in SITC 7 category of their trade statistics. 
 
3. Geopolitical aspects 
The geopolitical background of the Eurasian project is important due to 
the increasingly globalized nature of contemporary international relations in general 
and highly politicized global public perceptions of Russia and its external policies in 
particular. Even among experts, particularly in the West, the Eurasian integration 
tends to be closely associated with Russia, which is understandable yet rather un-
helpful from an academic perspective. Indeed, the EAEU may be dominated8 by 
Kremlin in all realms, yet in the modern history there has been no precedent of a 
power arrangement where Russia would be presented on at least formally equal 
terms with its neighbors, and in this respect the EAEU is an obvious breakthrough 
for the regional politics (Libman 2017).  
However, as the analysis in the previous section should have demonstrat-
ed, the bloc is still to become a similar breakthrough for regional economics. In-
deed, on the aggregate level it has so far failed to achieve visible advances not just in 
mutual merchandise trade, a cornerstone of any successful integration project, but 
also in other forms of economic exchange, notably foreign direct investment. This 
8 Domination here is understood foremost in economic terms scrutinized in the preceding section 
and does not necessarily equal to the notion of “hegemony” favored in some Russia-focused traits of 
contemporary political science literature. Nevertheless, it is this economic domination which argua-
bly has the greatest impact on the nature and style of decision-making related to the functioning of 
the EAEU. Notably, since Russia’s external economic standing is mostly shaped in “corporate hy-
drocarbon logic”, it has little if any internal impetus for streamlining EAEU regulation of internal 
trade. This may be a key factor behind reportedly slow progress in removing numerous barriers to 
internal trade despite the establishment of a special task force within the Eurasian Economic Com-
mission as early as in March 2016 (EEC 2019a). 
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is especially clear if one compares the EAEU with its western neighbor and coun-
terpart, the European Union. Despite numerous internal and external challenges, 
including those determined by enlargement and globalization, the latter has not only 
managed to uphold high levels of mutual merchandise and capital exchange, but al-
so their predominantly industrial nature, critical in the era of internationalized pro-
duction along global value chains.  
By contrast, the EAEU still seems to be “chained” foremost by gas and oil 
pipelines rather than anything else (Balmaceda 2013, 2017). Given their predomi-
nantly Russian roots, it is not surprising that the bloc is frequently considered a 
modern incarnation of Russian regional “hegemony” (Delcour & Kostanyan 2014; 
Balakishi 2016). Indeed, developments around Ukraine, as well as Armenia’s 2014 
last-moment turnaround in negotiations with the EU in favor of the entry into the 
EAEU, seem to justify such views. They also go well in line with popular anti-
Russian sentiments in the West, which received a major boost after the secession of 
Crimea in 2014 and in the course of protracted hostilities in Syria. Besides, one can 
uncover an internal dimension in the discussion of Russian neo-imperialistic agenda 
(if it at all exists): by taking an increasingly activist foreign policy stance, authorities 
in Kremlin may seek to divert attention of their electorate from numerous internal 
problems generated by the country’s neoliberal model of postsocialist transfor-
mation adopted in the early 1990s under Boris Yeltsin and uphold largely un-
changed by his successor Vladimir Putin.  
Such problems range from ageing and crippling infrastructure, particularly 
in remote areas, to unequal distribution of national wealth, epitomized by the phe-
nomenon of Russian oligarchy. Essentially, they were determined by radical proper-
ty reforms in the form of mass privatization that saw much of public wealth going 
into frequently unscrupulous private hands that chose to secure it offshore, thus 
diminishing local fiscal base and consequently resources for modernizing economic 
and social spheres inherited from the Soviet period (Abalkin & Whalley 1999; 
Ledyaeva et al. 2013). These new nouveau riches have naturally been interested in 
locking their advantages, in most cases related to commodities, by blocking any 
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changes not just to modalities of property relations in the country, but also to any 
economic measures that could transform its economic structure. As a result, Russia 
became a typical commodity-dependent economy9 with untypical geopolitical ambi-
tions highly irritating for the West. 
Historically, though, it is not novel, as this nation tended to play a far big-
ger role first in the European and then in the global politics than what could be jus-
tified by its economic and social fortunes. What does seem novel is the role energy 
combined with market size play in the present regional (as well as global) power dy-
namics. To be sure, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow seemed to have 
lost its geopolitical clout, but not for long. Backed by rising commodity prices in the 
decade preceding the global financial crisis (and following its sovereign default of 
August 1998), Russia not only recovered much of its output wiped out in the turbu-
lent 1990s, but made significant gains, particularly in current USD terms (see Figure 
5). In turn, the global financial crisis might have triggered reinvigoration of practical 
steps towards post-Soviet reintegration that led to the formal launch of the EAEU 
in 2015. As usual, though, political (and for Russia mostly geopolitical) necessities 
have left many economic nuances neglected, which did not take long to recover in 
numerous trade disputes with smaller integration partners.  
 
 
 
 
9 According to the UNCTAD, a country is dependent on commodities if they exceed 60% of its 
merchandise exports, and if their share exceeds 80%, which was the case for every second develop-
ing country as recently as in mid-2010s, such dependence is considered strong or extreme 
(UNCTAD 2017, p. 19). The analysis of the merchandise trade data established strong commodity 
dependence for all but one member of the EAEU, namely Belarus. Notably, in 2017 share of com-
modities in total merchandise exports of Armenia stood at 80% (on average 76% since 2009, and 
68% since 1995), for Kazakhstan the respective figures were 85%, 87% and 82%, for Kyrgyz Repub-
lic were 75%, 66% and 66%, and for Russia were 76%, 77% and 70% (UNCTAD 2019). In turn, 
commodities made up 46% of Belarus’ merchandise exports in 2017 (41% in preceding year), with a 
similar average share since 2009 and 38% since 1995. It should be noted, however, that in 1995 Bela-
rus’ commodity exports constituted just 15% of its total, or nearly four times less than the corre-
sponding average for other EAEU members in the same period. By 2018 this difference shrank to 
less than two times. 
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Figure 5. Trajectory of Russia’ GDP, 1990-2018. 
 
Source: World Bank 2019. 
These vicissitudes have become particularly vocal in bilateral relations be-
tween Russia and Belarus in 2017-2018, and given the latter’s specific geographic 
position and distinctive political stance towards its southern neighbor Ukraine, 
quickly gained a geopolitical dimension. Indeed, following a public spat between the 
leaders of two countries in late 2018 during an EAEU summit in St Petersburg, 
many observers, including those in the West, contemplated about no less than an 
imminent takeover of Belarus along the Crimean scenario (Carroll 2018; Ioffe 
2019). Such speculations were fueled by the position Moscow took in debating with 
authorities in Minsk the implications of tax reforms in its oil sector. Notably, some 
top level Russian officials, notably prime minister Dmitry Medvedev, publicly 
claimed that any compensation Belarus was seeking for worsening terms of oil trade 
as a result of the so called “tax maneuver” was dependent on more intense integra-
tion along the lines of the Union State Treaty (Preiherman 2019). 
To be sure, Belarus has long relied on special terms of energy supplies 
from its eastern neighbor, quite natural in the context of inherited and later upgrad-
ed Soviet-era pipeline network, refining capacity (similar, for instance, to those of 
Sweden or Turkey), and close political ties with Russia along the early and quite so-
phisticated bilateral legal framework (BP 2018). Moreover, the country was the first 
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among its post-Soviet peers to enter into formal agreements with Moscow, having 
signed a friendship treaty on 21 February 1995, a community treaty on 2 April 1996, 
a union treaty on 2 April 1997 and a declaration on further unity (25 December 
1998) that preceded the aforementioned and still valid Union State Treaty signed on 
8 December 1999 in Moscow (Union State 2019).  
Historical, political and other considerations aside, these agreements were 
determined by the extraordinary economic importance of Russia for a newly inde-
pendent Belarus which reflected itself foremost in foreign trade. Notably, in the ear-
ly-1990s Russia’ share in Belarus’ exports was on average over 70%, and in the late-
1990s was 60%, or several times higher than, for example, for other EAEU part-
ners: in 1995-1999 similar average figure for Armenia was 25%, Kazakhstan 34%, 
and Kyrgyz Republic just 22% (UNCTAD 2019). Reorienting so much of mer-
chandise exports to the West was hardly an option as most of them, no matter how 
feeble in absolute terms, were manufactured goods. Notably, their average share in 
total exports in the late 1990s was close to 80%, including in exports to Russia, 
while for Armenia the corresponding figure was 40%, and around 30% for Kazakh-
stan and Kyrgyz Republic, or several times lower than in the case of Belarus 
(UNCTAD 2019). And foreign trade played a special role for Belarus, averaging 
(merchandise exports and imports combined) 109% of its GDP from 1994 to 2017 
(World Bank 2019). In 2017, for instance, Belarus ranked 16th globally by this meas-
ure, usually referred to as a foreign trade quota. Foreign trade has been important 
for its Eurasian partners, too, but to a much lesser extent (see Figure 6). 
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Figure 6. Importance of foreign trade for EAEU partners, 2018. 
 
Note: in brackets – global rank among 182 countries and territories with the available data 
Source: World Bank 2019. 
 
On the background of the global commodity boom that began with the start 
of the new millennium, exports of fuel made from Russian crude imported on prac-
tically duty-free basis gained a major share in Belarus total merchandise outlays and 
foreign currency receipts (see Figure 7). As a result, the country has become fre-
quently disdained for allegedly taking advantage from “cheap” Russian energy sup-
plies which were attributed not just to most of its economic growth in recent dec-
ades but to the very endurance of president Lukashenka (incumbent since 1994) 
and his preferred model of postsocialist transformation (IMF 2012, p. 16; 
Dobrinsky 2016, p. 10; Soldatkin & Makhovsky 2016).  
Such speculations, however, downplayed at least two important facts. 
First, Belarus’ fuel export expansion was mirrored by its ballooning trade deficit 
with Russia. To be sure, since the mid-1990s the former had a positive balance in 
bilateral merchandise exchange with the latter only once, in 1997, when barter, or 
goods-for-goods exchange, was still widespread and could thus have a distortive 
impact. Furthermore, a cumulative deficit of Belarus in trade with Russia for the pe-
riod with available data (1995-2018) amounted to no less than 125 bn USD, which 
was very close to the country’s cumulative fuel exports in the same period, at 144 
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bn USD, depriving claims about alleged Belarus’ profiteering of at least some em-
pirical substance (UNCTAD 2019). Secondly, energy has been largely excluded 
from all trade arrangements in the former Soviet space, which is untypical for inter-
national trade practices in general and those underpinning the European integration 
in particular (Mattli 1999). Indeed, the very beginnings of the latter are associated 
with treaties establishing common markets for coal, steel and atomic energy, while 
in the Eurasian project creation of common energy markets was delayed until 2025, 
i.e. by as much as a decade from the official launch of the organization (EEC 2017; 
Zemskova 2018).  
 
Figure 7. Belarus’ fuel exports, 1995-2018. 
 
Source: UNCTAD 2019. 
 
Dragging along with the common energy agenda in the EAEU trade archi-
tecture, reportedly on the insistence of its dominant power, cannot raise suspicions 
about both the latter’s underlying intentions and the bloc’s overall future. Indeed, its 
short albeit rather intense history of trade disputes points at latent yet growing con-
cerns about the divergence of driving forces of the Eurasian integration. On the one 
hand it gets increasingly clear that Russia values it mostly for geopolitical reasons, or 
as a showcase of its regional gravitational potency. On the other hand, its partners, 
especially Belarus, seem to be concerned foremost about economic effects, notably 
market access and energy supplies at present and synergies in modernization efforts, 
particularly related to industrialization, in the future. For them geopolitical concerns 
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may have mostly instrumental value. And though their bargaining power vis-à-vis 
Russia is ultimately restricted by differences in size (see Table 1), these 
nuances can be considered secondary for resolving more fundamental political 
economy issues of the Eurasian integration project. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Historically projects in regional economic integration have been undertak-
en in attempt to boost welfare through synergies resulting from trade creation. Re-
flecting internationalization of global production in recent decades, this traditional 
rationale has been expanded to include more intense cross-border foreign direct in-
vestment exchange. By both these measures the EAEU is yet to deliver: the share of 
mutual trade has stuck at around 12% of total, while cross-border FDI has been 
even less significant and actually decreased. Such dynamics were determined fore-
most by sector specifics of regional economic relations, as well as by the models of 
postsocialist transformation adopted in the early 1990s, particularly by Russia as the 
biggest partner and one of the keenest adepts of neoliberalism in that period. In-
deed, following rapid deindustrialization along “discipline and encouragement” ne-
oliberal agenda in the spirit of the original “Washington consensus”, mutual mer-
chandise and investment exchange in ex-USSR, including among its Eurasian part-
ners, was swiftly dominated by commodities. At the same time, the natural appetite 
for consumerism, previously restrained by ideology but unleashed with the Soviet 
demise, was no less swiftly met by imports, helped by eased access to foreign fi-
nance eventually settled in foreign debt (Yarashevich 2013, p. 211). The global fi-
nancial crisis did trigger some changes in these patterns, which were helped by new 
geopolitical positioning of Russia. One can observe this in relatively higher shares 
of manufacturing when it comes to mutual merchandise trade, as well as regional 
employment and output profiles. Yet these trends have not been backed by intense 
mutual capital exchange, and this may pose one of the most serious political econ-
omy challenges for the future of the Eurasian integration.  
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As argued in 2012 by the authors of the EBRD’s flagship “Transition re-
port” dedicated to regional economic integration, the latter “has the potential to 
bring multiple economic benefits” provided that the following issues are dealt with: 
non-tariff barriers to trade are lowered, cross-border infrastructure is improved, the 
use of tariff barriers with other countries is limited, market access to service sectors 
is liberalized, and institutions at the level of regional performance are strengthened 
(EBRD 2012, p. 63). There is also an interesting view that regional economic inte-
gration nowadays aims at bridging fragmented economic activity along global value 
chains with trade rules originating more than half a century ago, prior to the onset 
of the digital era (Baldwin 2011). But meeting these ambitious goals implies fore-
most the absence of restrictions in trade among partners (free trade zone) and a uni-
fied approach to third parties (customs union).  
Featuring these prerequisites formally, the EAEU is still lagging behind 
with their practical implementation, which is testified by stagnant dynamics and ra-
ther unsophisticated structural profile of mutual merchandise and investment ex-
change as well as numerous internal trade disputes. Given the ultimate failure of the 
previous grand regional unity attempt under Moscow-based leadership in the form 
of USSR, it is clear that the Eurasian project can succeed only if it learns from its 
own as well as the European experience. Apparently, the most important lesson 
here would concern rebalancing political and economic considerations: globalization 
pressures should make the latter not just proclaimed, but the real priority. So far this 
appeared problematic, but the global financial crisis and ensuing economic and po-
litical troubles could and should have provided the necessary impetus for a new ap-
proach to common economic and social development in the still evolving institu-
tional framework of the EAEU.  
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